QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and Promulgated:
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD,
Respondents.
x-
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- - - - - - - - - - x
CARPIO, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari[1]
seeks to reverse the Decision dated
The
facts are not in dispute. As summarized by the Solicitor General, the facts are
as follows:
1. On
a.
DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;
b.
DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993;
c. Art.
II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in
199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).
2.
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on
3. Accordingly,
petitioners filed an Amended Petition on
4. On P100,000.00, which petitioners subsequently complied with.
5. On
6. Upon
the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma. Cristina Cornejo, both the
petitioners and respondents were required to file their respective Memoranda.
Petitioners likewise filed [their] Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the
case was deemed submitted for decision.
7.
Consequently, on
Hence, this petition.
The RTC’s Ruling
The dispositive portion of the RTC’s
Decision dated
WHEREFORE, [t]he Petition is denied/dismissed insofar as petitioners seek to declare null and void ab initio DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993, Administrative Order No. 1, and Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated by the DPWH thru the TRB, the presumed validity thereof not having been overcome; but the petition is granted insofar as DPWH Department Order No. 123 is concerned, declaring the same to be invalid for being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise
the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE RTC’S DECISION IS ALREADY BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
2. WHETHER DO 74, DO 215 AND THE TRB REGULATIONS CONTRAVENE RA 2000; AND
3. WHETHER AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.[5]
The petition is partly meritorious.
Whether the
RTC’s Decision Dismissing
Petitioners’
Case is Barred by Res Judicata
Petitioners rely
on the RTC’s Order dated
Petitioners are
mistaken. As the RTC correctly stated, the Order dated
Validity of DO 74, DO 215
and the TRB Regulations
Petitioners claim that DO 74,[8] DO 215,[9] and the TRB’s Rules and Regulations issued under them violate the provisions of RA 2000. They contend that the two issuances unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in Section 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways. Petitioners assert that the DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or central dividing sections. They claim that the DPWH is only allowed to re-design the physical structure of toll ways, and not to determine “who or what can be qualified as toll way users.”[10]
Section 4 of RA 2000[11] reads:
SEC. 4. Design of limited access facility. — The
Department of Public Works and Communications is authorized to so design any
limited access facility and to so regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to
best serve the traffic for which such facility is intended; and its
determination of such design shall be final. In this connection, it is
authorized to divide and separate any limited access facility into separate
roadways by the construction of raised curbings, central dividing sections, or
other physical separations, or by designating such separate roadways by signs,
markers, stripes, and the proper lane for such traffic by appropriate signs,
markers, stripes and other devices. No person, shall have any right of ingress
or egress to, from or across limited access facilities to or from abutting
lands, except at such designated points at which access may be permitted, upon
such terms and conditions as may be specified from time to time. (Emphasis
supplied)
On
SUBJECT: Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing
Limited Access
Highways
By
virtue of the authority granted the Secretary [of] Public Works and
Communications under Section 3 of R.A. 2000, otherwise known as the Limited
Access Highway Act, the following rules and regulations governing limited
access highways are hereby promulgated for the guidance of all concerned:
x x x
x
Section
3 – On limited access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of
persons to:
x x x
x
(h) Drive
any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized);
x
x x x[12]
(Emphasis supplied)
On
SUBJECT: Declaration of the
Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 2000, a limited access facility is defined as “a highway or street
especially designed for through traffic,
and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other
persons have no right or easement or only a limited right or easement of
access, light, air or view by reason of the fact that their proper[t]y abuts
upon such limited access facility or for any other reason. Such highways or streets may be parkways,
from which trucks, buses, and other commerical [sic] vehicles shall be
excluded; or they may be free ways open to use by all customary forms of street
and highway traffic.”
Section 3 of the same Act authorizes the
Department of Public Works and Communications (now Department of Public Works
and Highways) “to plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve,
maintain, and provide limited access facilities for public use wherever it is
of the opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such special facilities.”
Therefore, by virtue of the authority
granted above, the Department of Public Works and Highways hereby designates
and declares the Balintawak to Tabang Sections of the North Luzon Expressway,
and the Nichols to Alabang Sections of the South Luzon Expressways, to be
LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAYS/FACILITIES subject to such rules and regulations that
may be imposed by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).
In view thereof, the National Capital
Region (NCR) of this Department is hereby ordered, after consultation with the
TRB and in coordination with the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to close all illegal openings along the said
Limited Access Highways/Facilities. In this
connection, the NCR is instructed to
organize its own enforcement and security group for the purpose of assuring the
continued closure of the right-of-way fences and the implementation of the
rules and regulations that may be imposed by the DPWH thru the TRB.
This Order shall take effect
immediately.[13]
On
SUBJECT:
Declaration of the R-1
Expressway, from
Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 2000, a limited access facility is defined as “a highway or street
especially designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to which owners or
occupants of abutting land or other persons have no right or easement or only a
limited right or easement of access, light, air or view by reason of the fact
that their property abuts upon such
limited access facility or for any other reason. Such highways or streets may be parkways,
from which trucks, buses, and other commercial vehicles shall be excluded; or they may be free ways open to
use by all customary forms of street and highway traffic.”
Section 3 of the same Act authorizes the
Department of Public Works and Communications (now Department of Public Works
and Highways) “to plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve,
maintain, and provide limited access facilities for public use wherever it is
of the opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such
special facilities.”
Therefore, by virtue of the authority
granted above, the Department of Public Works and Highways hereby designates
and declares the R-1 Expressway, C-5 Link Expressway and the R-1 Extension
Expressway Sections of the Manila Cavite Toll Expressway to be LIMITED ACCESS
HIGHWAYS/FACILITIES subject to such rules and regulations that may be imposed
by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).
In view thereof, the National Capital
Region (NCR) of this Department is hereby ordered, after consultation with the
TRB and in coordination with the Philippine National Police (PNP), to close all
illegal openings along the said Limited Access Highways/Facilities. In this connection, the NCR is instructed to
organize its own enforcement and security group for the purpose of assuring the continued closure of the
right-of-way fences and the implementation of the rules and regulations that may be imposed by the
DPWH thru the TRB.
This Order shall take effect immediately.[14]
The RTC held
that Section 4 of RA 2000 expressly authorized the DPWH to design limited
access facilities and to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to serve the
traffic for which such facilities are intended. According to the RTC, such
authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit logically includes the
determination of who and what can and cannot be
permitted entry or access into the limited access facilities. Thus, the
RTC concluded that AO 1, DO 74, and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities,
which ban motorcycles’ entry or access to the limited access facilities, are
not inconsistent with RA 2000.
RA 2000,
otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, was approved on
The RTC’s ruling is based on a wrong premise. The RTC assumed that the DPWH derived its authority from its predecessor, the Department of Public Works and Communications, which is expressly authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities under Section 4 of RA 2000. However, such assumption fails to consider the evolution of the Department of Public Works and Communications.
Under Act No.
2711, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, approved on
On
With the amendment of the 1973 Philippine Constitution in 1976, resulting in the shift in the form of government, national agencies were renamed from Departments to Ministries. Thus, the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications became the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications.
On
On the other hand, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications became the “primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity of the executive branch of the government in the promotion, development, and regulation of a dependable and coordinated network of transportation and communication systems.”[19] The functions of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications were:
a. Coordinate and supervise all activities of
the Ministry relative to transportation and communications;
b.
Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the
preparation and implementation of an integrated and comprehensive
transportation and communications system at the national, regional and local
levels;
c. Establish and administer comprehensive
and integrated programs for transportation and communication, and for this
purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or organization, whether
government or private, whose development programs include transportation and
communications as an integral part to participate and assist in the preparation
and implementation of such programs;
d. Regulate, whenever necessary,
activities relative to transportation and communications and prescribe and
collect fees in the exercise of such
power;
e.
Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and
communications research and development programs of the government in
coordination with other institutions concerned; and
f.
Perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry into effect
the provisions of this Executive Order.[20]
(Emphasis supplied)
On
Upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution in February 1987, the former Ministry of Public Works and Highways became the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the former Ministry of Transportation and Communications became the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
DPWH issued
DO 74 and DO 215 declaring certain expressways as limited access facilities on
Under Section 1
of EO 546, the Ministry of Public Works (now DPWH) assumed the public
works functions of the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications. On the other hand, among the functions of the Ministry
of Transportation and Communications (now Department of Transportation
and Communications [DOTC]) were to (1) formulate and recommend national policies and
guidelines for the preparation and implementation of an integrated and
comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national,
regional, and local levels; and (2) regulate, whenever necessary, activities
relative to transportation and communications and prescribe and collect
fees in the exercise of such power. Clearly,
under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not
the DPWH, which has authority to
regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities.
Even under Executive Order
No. 125 (EO 125)[24]
and Executive Order No. 125-A (EO 125-A),[25] which
further reorganized the DOTC, the authority to administer and enforce all laws,
rules and regulations relative to transportation is clearly with the DOTC.[26]
Thus, DO 74 and
DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities.
Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and
enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.
Since
the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation,
the TRB[27]
cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue
regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot
delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it follows
that the rules implementing them are likewise void.
Whether AO 1 and DO 123
are Unconstitutional
DPWH Secretary Simeon
A. Datumanong issued DO 123 on
SUBJECT: Revised
Rules and Regulations
Governing
Limited Access Highways
By virtue of the authority granted the Secretary of
Public Works and Highways under Section 3 of R.A. 2000, otherwise known as the
Limited Access Highway Act, the following revised rules and regulations
governing limited access highways are hereby promulgated for the guidance of
all concerned:
1. Administrative Order No. 1 dated
a. Motorcycles shall have an engine
displacement of at least 400 cubic centimeters (cc) provided that:
x x x x[28]
(Emphasis supplied)
The RTC’s
Decision dated
We need not pass upon the constitutionality of the classification of motorcycles under DO 123. As previously discussed, the DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.
On the other hand, the assailed portion of AO 1 states:
Section 3. On limited access
highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to:
x x x x
(h) Drive any bicycle,
tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized);
x x x x
Petitioners assail the DPWH’s failure to provide
“scientific” and “objective” data on the danger of having motorcycles plying
our highways. They attack this exercise of police power as baseless and
unwarranted. Petitioners belabor the fact that there are studies that provide
proof that motorcycles are safe modes of transport. They also claim that AO 1
introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from other
motorized modes of transport. Finally, petitioners argue that AO 1 violates
their right to travel.
Petitioners’
arguments do not convince us.
We
emphasize that the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications issued AO 1 on
Section 3
of RA 2000[29]
authorized the issuance of the guidelines.
In contrast, DPWH issued DO 74, DO 215 and DO 123 after EO 546
devolved to the DOTC the authority to regulate limited access highways.
We now
discuss the constitutionality of AO 1. Administrative issuances have the force
and effect of law.[30]
They benefit from the same presumption of validity and constitutionality
enjoyed by statutes.[31]
These two precepts place a heavy burden upon any party assailing governmental
regulations. The burden of proving
unconstitutionality rests on such party.[32] The burden becomes heavier when the police
power is at issue.
The use of
public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of
the police power of the state.[33] The police power is far-reaching in scope and
is the “most essential, insistent and illimitable” of all government powers.[34] The tendency is to extend rather than to
restrict the use of police power. The
sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness.[35] What is “reasonable” is not subject to exact
definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness
exists,[36]
for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.[37]
We find
that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines several
precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules were
designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within
limited access facilities. They cover several subjects, from what lanes should
be used by a certain vehicle, to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition of
certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these rules violates
reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic behind them are quite evident.
A toll way is not an ordinary road. The special purpose for which a toll way is
constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use
and operation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the
mere fact that certain rights are restricted does not invalidate the rules.
Consider
Section 3(g) of AO 1, which prohibits the conduct of rallies inside toll ways.[38]
The regulation affects the right to peaceably assemble. The exercise of police
power involves restriction, restriction being implicit in the power itself.
Thus, the test of constitutionality of a police power measure is limited to an
inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on constitutional rights is
reasonable, and not whether it imposes a restriction on those rights.
None of the
rules outlined in AO 1 strikes us as arbitrary and capricious. The DPWH,
through the Solicitor General, maintains that the toll ways were not designed
to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will
compromise safety and traffic considerations. The DPWH points out that the same
study the petitioners rely on cites that the inability of other drivers to
detect motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents.[39]
Arguably, prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the “best”
measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply the toll ways.
However,
the means by which the government chooses to act is not judged in terms of what
is “best,” rather, on simply whether the act is reasonable. The validity of a
police power measure does not depend upon the absolute assurance that the
purpose desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon the
certainty that it will best serve the purpose intended.[40] Reason, not scientific exactitude, is the
measure of the validity of the governmental regulation. Arguments based on what
is “best” are arguments reserved for the Legislature’s discussion. Judicial
intervention in such matters will only be warranted if the assailed regulation
is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in this case to be so.
Neither do
we find AO 1 oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to
use the limited access facility. They
are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the
rules on how to use the facility. AO 1
does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely
bars motorcycles, bicycles,
tricycles, pedicabs, and
any non-
motorized
vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways.[41]
Several cheap, accessible and practical alternative modes of transport are open
to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in being required to take a bus or
drive a car instead of one’s scooter, bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle
upon using a toll way.
Petitioners’ reliance on the studies
they gathered is misplaced. Police power does not rely upon the existence of
definitive studies to support its use. Indeed, no requirement exists that the
exercise of police power must first be conclusively justified by research. The
yardstick has always been simply whether the government’s act is reasonable and
not oppressive.[42]
The use of “reason” in this sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary
and capricious government action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness,
though desirable, may not be demanded in every situation. Otherwise, no
government will be able to act in situations demanding the exercise of its
residual powers because it will be tied up conducting studies.
A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the law.[43] Petitioners’ attempt to seek redress from the motorcycle ban under the aegis of equal protection must fail. Petitioners’ contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles out motorcycles is specious. To begin with, classification by itself is not prohibited.[44]
A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, it is not based on real or substantial differences. As explained by Chief Justice Fernando in Bautista v. Juinio:[45]
x x x To assure that the general welfare be promoted,
which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty
and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoked the
equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that
finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must
be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical is analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.
We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models.[46] We find that real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.
A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity. Moreover, we take note that the Philippines is home to a host of unique motorized modes of transport ranging from modified hand-carts (kuliglig) to bicycle “sidecars” outfitted with a motor. To follow petitioners’ argument to its logical conclusion would open up toll ways to all these contraptions. Both safety and traffic considerations militate against any ruling that would bring about such a nightmare.
Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly deprive them of their right to travel.
We are not persuaded.
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.
The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.
Petitioners
themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their complaint
is that these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their
claim is true, it hardly qualifies as an undue curtailment of their freedom of
movement and travel. The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best
form of transport or to the most convenient route to his destination. The
obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e.,
potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.), are not suffered by them
alone.
Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a driver’s license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are mistaken. There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group is allowed to drive motor vehicles: those who pass the tests administered by the LTO. A driver’s license issued by the LTO merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not a license to drive or operate any form of transportation on any type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the other hand merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not preclude the government from prescribing which roads are accessible to certain vehicles.
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the
petition. We MODIFY the Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNOAssociate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
|
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice
|
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
|
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Revised Rules and Regulations
Governing Limited Access Highways, issued on
[3] Rollo, pp. 330-333.
[4]
[5]
[6] Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 64220, 31 March 1992, 207 SCRA 622.
[7] Urbanes,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117964,
[8] Declaring the North and
[9] Declaring the R-1 Expressway, the C-5 Link Expressway and the R-1 Extension Expressway as Limited Access Facilities.
[10] Rollo, p. 31.
[11] Limited Access Highway Act,
approved on
[12] Rollo, pp. 89-90.
[13]
[14]
[15] Section 75 of Act No. 2711.
[16] Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
[17] The purpose for the creation of two separate ministries was explained in the “WHEREAS” clauses of EO 546:
WHEREAS, the accelerated pace of national development requires the effective, purposeful and unified implementation of public works projects and the effective control and supervision of transportation and communications facilities and services;
WHEREAS, the development, rehabilitation, improvement, construction, maintenance and repairs of ports, flood control and drainage systems, buildings, water supply systems; and other public works facilities involve the utilization of technologies and manpower different from those required for the control and supervision of transportation and communications facilities and services;
WHEREAS, a rational distribution of the functions of government pertaining to public works on one hand and control and supervision of facilities and services related to transportation and communications on the other would enhance the efficiency of government;
WHEREAS, in keeping with the policy of government to effect continuing reforms in the organizational structure to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, it is necessary to entrust in one ministry all functions pertaining to the construction, repair and maintenance of public works facilities and restructure the organization for the control and supervision of transportation and communications facilities and services in the country; and
x x x x
[18] Section 3 of EO 546.
[19] Section 6 of EO 546.
[20] Section 8 of EO 546.
[21] See “WHEREAS” clauses of EO 710.
[22] Presidential Decree No. 458, creating the Department of Public Highways, provides under Section 3 the function of the department:
SEC. 3. Relationships between the Department Proper, the Bureaus and the Regional Offices. – The Department Proper shall have direct line supervision over the bureaus and regional offices. It shall be responsible for developing and implementing programs on the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and airport runways. The Bureau of Construction and Maintenance shall be essentially staff in character and as such, shall exercise only functional supervision over the regional offices, while the Bureau of Equipment shall provide equipment support to the field offices through its equipment depots and area shops. x x x
[23] This authority was expressly granted to the Department of Public Works and Communications under Section 4 of RA 2000.
[24] Reorganization Act of the Ministry
of Transportation and Communications, approved on
[25] Amending EO 125, approved on
[26] Section 5 of EO 125, as amended by EO 125-A, enumerates the powers and functions of the DOTC:
Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. — To accomplish its mandate, the Department [DOTC] shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of integrated and comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national, regional and local levels;
(b) Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications, and for this purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or organization, whether public or private, whose development programs include transportation and communications as an integral part thereof, to participate and assist in the preparation and implementation of such program;
(c) Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and communication research and development programs of the government in coordination with other institutions concerned;
(d) Administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications;
(e) Coordinate with the Department of Public Works and Highways in the design, location, development, rehabilitation, improvement, construction, maintenance and repair of all infrastructure projects and facilities of the Department. However, government corporate entities attached to the Department shall be authorized to undertake specialized telecommunications, ports, airports and railways projects and facilities as directed by the President of the Philippines or as provided by law;
(f) Establish, operate and maintain a nationwide postal system that shall include mail processing, delivery services, and money order services and promote the art of philately;
(g) Issue certificates of public convenience for the operation of public land and rail transportation utilities and services;
(h) Accredit foreign aircraft manufacturers and/or international organizations for aircraft certification in accordance with established procedures and standards;
(i) Establish and prescribe rules and regulations for identification of routes, zones and/or areas of operation of particular operators of public land services;
(j) Establish and prescribe rules and regulations for the establishment, operation and maintenance of such telecommunications facilities in areas not adequately served by the private sector in order to render such domestic and overseas services that are necessary with due consideration for advances in technology;
(k) Establish and prescribe rules and regulations for the operation and maintenance of a nationwide postal system that shall include mail processing, delivery services, money order services and promotion of philately;
(l) Establish and prescribe rules and regulations for the issuance of certificates of public convenience for public land transportation utilities, such as motor vehicles, trimobiles and railways;
(m) Establish and prescribe rules and regulations for the inspection and registration of air and land transportation facilities, such as motor vehicles, trimobiles, railways and aircrafts;
(n) Establish and prescribe rules and regulations for the issuance of licenses to qualified motor vehicle drivers, conductors, and airmen;
(o) Establish and prescribe the corresponding rules and regulations for the enforcement of laws governing land transportation, air transportation and postal services, including the penalties for violations thereof, and for the deputation of appropriate law enforcement agencies in pursuance thereof;
(p) Determine, fix and/or prescribe charges and/or rates pertinent to the operation of public air and land transportation utility facilities and services, except such rates and/or charges as may prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Board under its charter, and, in cases where charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies or associations recognized by the Philippine government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;
(q) Establish and prescribe the rules, regulations, procedures and standards for the accreditation of driving schools;
(r) Administer and operate the Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC) and the National Telecommunications Training Institute (NTTI); and
(s) Perform such other powers and functions as
may be prescribed by law, or as may be necessary, incidental, or proper to its
mandate or as may be assigned from time to time by the President of the
Republic of the
[27] The TRB, which was created under
Presidential Decree No. 1112, was attached to the DPWH on
[28] Rollo, p. 242.
[29] Section 3 of RA 2000 reads:
SEC. 3. Authority to establish limited access facilities. — The Department of Public Works and Communications is hereby authorized to plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide limited access facilities for public use wherever it is of the opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such special facilities: Provided, That within provinces, cities and towns, the establishment of such limited access facilities insofar as they affect provincial, city and municipal streets and plazas shall have the consent of provincial board, city or municipal council as the case may be.
[30] Eslao
v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 108310,
[31]
[32] JMM Promotion and Management,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120095,
[33] Wall v. King, 109 F. Supp. 198 (1952); Munz v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (1933); Schwartzman Service v. Stahl, 60 F.2d 1034 (1932).
[34] Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1163 (1957).
[35] Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, 21 December 1989, 180 SCRA 533.
[36] City
of
[37] Board of Zoning Appeals of Decatur v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
[38] Section 3 – On limited access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to:
x x x x
(g) Jaywalk, loiter, litter, or travel by foot, drive or herd animals, conduct or hold rallies, parades, funeral processions and the like;
x x x x
[39] Rollo, p. 395.
[40] Hunter
v. Owens, 80
[41] See American Motorcyclist
Ass’n. v. Park Comm’n. of City of
[42]
[43] Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).
[44] Dumlao
v. COMELEC, No. L-52245,
[45] 212 Phil. 307, 317-318 (1984).